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RiCHARD MOHR
Law and Argument for a Culturally Diverse World: 
How not to Communicate
This paper reviews the role of discourse in law and public life and identifies threats to the 
polity from malicious forms of communication. in addition to its role in legal argument, 
communication is fundamental to public debate in the formation of laws and policies, 
and it constitutes the social and political fabric through the use of forms of address 
and recognition of others. This argument builds on aspects of discourse theory and 
feminist and other critiques of it that suggest that it applies to a narrow community 
of discourse, and so excludes other cultures. it takes a broad view of participants in 
public debate, which necessarily crosses national and cultural borders. responsible 
communication demands that we argue in good faith, truthfully and coherently, and 
that we recognize our partners in discussion, both for who they are and for their place 
in a shared community. The paper argues that public discourse has sunk to dangerous 
levels in the present century, citing examples of bad faith, provocation and insult from 
australian prime ministers (2002, 2015) and presidential candidates in France (2005) 
and the united States (2016). it concludes that lying, incoherence, self-contradiction, 
insult and injury fall outside the bounds of public discourse. rapid communicative 
intervention is needed to identify each of these malicious forms of communication as 
a betrayal of the civic public, before it provokes the next vicious response.
Keywords: cultural diversity; discourse theory; epistemology; law; malicious commu-
nication; rhetoric.
Part 1 – Law and Communication
1.1. Public Discourse and Law
Discourse and argumentation are fundamental to law. This has been 
increasingly well-understood with the declining dominance of positivism, 
which emphasized rules over argument and the state as the single source 
of law. This article explores the implications of this renewed focus on dis-
course and law in contemporary polities. Earlier conceptions of the polity, 
from Aristotle to Habermas, assumed a degree of homogeneity among the 
discursive participants. Clearly the gender and class of the political actors 
have become more various over the centuries. However, as long as a polity 
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is defined by linguistic and national boundaries there will be constraints 
on the inclusiveness of discourse. Major cultural differences become sali-
ent when discourse is conducted internationally, or among diverse cultural 
groups within a national community. Because of migration, global trade 
and telecommunications (the Internet, news and television networks), these 
circumstances now prevail widely within and across nations. This diversity 
of discursive participants is the first impetus for this inquiry into the criteria 
for effective communication.
The second impetus is the disconnect currently experienced in public 
discourse between, on the one hand, the guidance and exhortation to com-
municative competence and ethics, and on the other hand the deplorable 
state of much current political and legal debate around matters of legislation, 
election, argument and ajudication. This inquiry is driven by the need for 
relevance in an environment of mistrust, untruth and xenophobia. These 
unfortunate communicative practices are not new, but their contemporary 
prevalence has caused this author to rethink the priorities in communicative 
ethics. Earlier work parsing and analyzing the niceties of civil and inclusive 
debate seems increasingly irrelevant. This paper aims to identify the vices as 
well as the virtues of communication in a culturally diverse world.
“Culture” is used here in a broad sense to indicate a complex of beliefs, 
practices, tastes and ways of communicating that inhere in groups and may 
vary between them. Following Appiah (2016), the gulf between Arnold’s 
“high” culture and Tylor’s “primitive” culture is seen as confused and ill- 
-conceived. On the other hand, Bourdieu’s analysis of culture penetrates the 
subtle social differences within as well as between societies.1 Having adopted 
a broad definition of culture, my discussions of “intercultural” or “cross- 
-cultural” communication or discourse apply equally to relations between 
different groups with their own ways of thinking and communicating. Those 
groups could be based on class (even within quite small populations), on 
language (whether dialect or lingua franca), on religion (from sects to world 
religions), and so on. In each case, scale is irrelevant: what is important is the 
need to communicate between cultural groups, whether in the next street or 
around the world. The nation-state has long been taken to be the natural level 
on which public discourse takes place, based on assumptions of ethnic homo-
geneity, common language and exclusive legal sovereignty. Those cultural 
and jurisprudential assumptions will be questioned in the following pages.
1 Bourdieu (2010: 61, 69) critiques the ideological “naturalization” of taste as a product of class 
struggle that denies its social and cultural origin: “Every material inheritance is, strictly speaking, 
also a cultural inheritance”.
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The aim of this inquiry is to explore some of the neglected aspects of 
discourse in the public sphere, particularly as it is relevant to legal debate. 
This is taken to include debates in legislatures, in electoral contests, and in 
arguments within and around litigation and adjudication. While discourse 
theory and communicative ethics have effectively addressed the criteria for 
good communicative practices in homogeneous polities, this paper asks 
broader questions. The particular focus is on heterogeneous communities, 
both within and across national borders. And rather than emphasizing 
ideal communicative practices, the focus turns to unethical, malicious and 
vicious ways of communicating, in order to identify forms of debate that are 
unacceptable in diverse communities. A clearer understanding of the limits 
of public discourse will lead to some conclusions as to how to respond to 
malicious forms of communication.
The first part of the paper shows how discourse, as argumentation and 
as communicative action, enters into key aspects of the legal process. Each 
of the following approaches to law’s relationship to discourse and language 
has been important in illuminating the links between law and the humanities. 
If not always specifically referring to law per se or narrowly defined, they have 
helped to show how law is argued, constituted or embedded in the polity.
The second part considers the virtues required for good communication. 
This work assumes, as a baseline, Habermas’s (1990) long-running project 
of specifying the conditions for communicative action and the debates 
it has stimulated. That work is expanded with a particular emphasis on 
communication among diverse participants. So, as well as the Kantian and 
Habermasian virtues of arguing in good faith and adhering to truthfulness, 
coherence and non-contradiction, we add recognition of difference within 
discursive communities. Recognition must have cognitive, constative, con-
structive and performative dimensions. 
The third part of the article, spurred by concern over the increasingly 
vicious tone of public discourse in western democracies, seeks to understand 
and diagnose communicative vices.2 The structure of this argument takes the 
comparatively well-known virtues and considers how they are inverted into 
vices: bad faith (lying, incoherence and self-contradiction) and misrecogni-
tion (insult, offense, blasphemy and curse). 
In line with its focus on public and intercultural communication, the arti-
cle concludes by identifying the most pernicious forms of miscommunication 
2 Here I take advantage of the semantic relationship between the noun “vice”, as the opposite of 
virtue, and its adjectival form “vicious”, which also indicates excessive violence and malevolence. 
Both senses are fully intended.
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in diverse polities and proposing responses. The argument goes beyond a 
Habermasian advocacy of communicative virtues in its forensic and diag-
nostic analysis of communicative vices, to denounce them as betrayals of 
humanity.
1.2. Argumentation in Law
One could draw on numerous and diverse sources to try to define the nature 
of law. However, the purpose of this article is not to attempt to explain law 
beginning from first principles, but rather to consider the importance of 
discourse and argumentation in public and legal communication. For this 
purpose, I adopt Santos’s comprehensive, if not definitive, view of law as 
a body of regularized procedures and normative standards, considered justiciable 
in a given group, which contribute to the creation and prevention of disputes, as well 
as to their settlement through an argumentative discourse coupled with the threat 
of force. (1995: 112)
Discourse and argumentation are central to law, whether at a national 
or local level. This definition emphasizes disputes, the locus for the 
resolution of which may be a formal law court or some informal forum. 
The emphasis in the passage quoted on the standards specific to a given 
group opens the discussion to a plurality of legal regimes which can co- 
-exist and interpenetrate. Santos and other legal pluralists have focused 
on informal and alternative dispute resolution, which can operate on 
a number of levels, from small local communities to nation-states and 
international arbitration. 
The role of discourse and communication in law is expanded by con-
sidering the relevance of argumentation theory to formal adjudication, and 
consequently to discourse more broadly. Coherence is widely held to be 
a central value in judicial deliberation. Kennedy addresses the problem of 
the missing link between strict legal deduction and the (just) decision by 
looking at a wide range of proposed solutions. For MacCormick, Dworkin 
and the Franco-German “free law” (or “free research”) movement, coher-
ence is a key component of that link (Kennedy, 1997: 31-38). Yet coherence 
is a two-edged sword in judicial interpretation. On one reading, coherence 
within the law leads to a closed system which is sealed off from broader 
public discourse (Teubner, 1989: 752). Lukács even saw demands for inter-
nal coherence as leading to the fetishization of law (Varga, 1985: 114, 140). 
However, it is possible to posit coherence as a way out of this cul-de-sac. 
Gény’s solution to the inability of strict law to provide the means to decide 
law and argument for a culturally diverse World: how not to communicate | 77
every case was to propose the judge’s power to look outside the law, by means 
of “free and scientific research” (Frydman, 2011: 8). 
Perelman developed this by proposing that argumentation allows 
a choice of actions. It is the basis of discussion and deliberation by means 
of which one justifies, objects, refutes and gives reasons. He saw this “logic 
of value judgments” as the alternative to the dilemma arising from the 
elimination, in the previous two decades, of the middle ground “between 
an irrationalism and a positivism, both alien to the idea of the reasonable 
so important in law” (Perelman, 1980: 108). This method of deliberating 
and deciding clearly applies to judicial deliberation. Once it is accepted 
that the role of the judge is to mediate and decide between two arguments 
rather than to apply a strict rule to a specific case, the field is open for 
a discourse analysis of the judicial process. The relevance of this approach 
was demonstrated in the work of the Belgian courts throughout the 1960s, 
when the approach of Perelman and the école de Bruxelles was 
integrated […] into judicial practice to effect profound and lasting changes in the 
very content of law, in the manner of deciding cases and more broadly in the role of 
the judge in a democratic society. (Frydman, 2011: 3)
Coherence is also relevant to public discourse through epistemological 
considerations. On this reading, legal discourse need not be merely internally 
coherent but may be linked to ways of knowing in the world outside the 
law. Amaya (2008: 306) calls for “epistemic responsibility”, according to 
which the judge would have to test factual claims by reference to “coher-
ence in like circumstances”. Brenner (2011) recognizes that in scientific 
as in judicial reasoning there are aporias of decision-making which must 
be overcome by appeals to values such as coherence. Adopted by feminist 
epistemology, coherence theory offers a radically open approach, connect-
ing “knowledge, power and desire” in a project for a “normative theory of 
knowledge that can offer an epistemic account of how evaluative distinctions 
between competing claims should (and can) be made” (Alcoff, 1996: 2). 
Coherence will be considered below as an important virtue in public and 
judicial communication. 
1.3. Communicative Action, Legislation and the Polity
Law is expressed in legislation as much as in judicial decision-making. 
Here too we can see the relevance of public discourse to electoral and 
parliamentary debate and to discussion in the various public forums that 
set legislative agendas. High profile events and moral panics are known to 
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drive legislative change, for example in “law and order” campaigns and 
the issue of “terrorism” versus human rights. These political and legislative 
programs are mediated through public discourse in a range of mainstream 
and social media. 
At a more fundamental level it has been proposed that communicative 
action constitutes the polity itself. Such an idea can be traced back to 
Aristotle’s (1995) conception of the good life as based in public, political 
action, and Hegel’s (1967) linkage of law with association, plurality and 
publicness (Cohen and Arato, 1992: xiv). Here we focus on some more 
recent developments of the theme of communicative action. 
Communication is, first of all, fundamental to our humanity. 
Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically 
human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every 
newcomer: ‘Who are you?’. (Arendt, 1959: 158)
In such a schema, action contributes to the polity, while we enact our huma- 
nity in and for the public sphere. 
In his analyses of decision-making within democratic states, Habermas 
has proposed that legitimacy derives from optimal communication among 
all participants. After initially applying it simply to the democratic processes 
of the public sphere (Habermas, 1990, 1991), Habermas extended his theory 
into law with Between Facts and Norms. His explicit intention was to save law 
from systems theory and to bring back intention and the relevance of rational 
debate to law: in short, to reinstate “the internal connection between law 
and the constitutional organization of the origin, acquisition and use of 
political power” (Habermas, 1996: 50). 
Part 2 – Communicative Virtues
2.1. Good Faith
The first principle of ethical argumentation and public discourse is the 
requirement to argue in good faith: no lies, maintain coherence, and avoid 
self-contradiction. Each one of these requirements could be discussed and 
qualified at length, but here I will go into a minimum of discussion about 
the nature of each. 
Truthfulness
To lie is to be untruthful: to say things that are false. Two points need making 
here: first, whether there is an intention to tell falsehoods and, second, how 
truth is to be defined. Of course, each of these is a broad field of inquiry. 
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Intention is central to findings of guilt in criminal law, and an important 
subject of philosophy (Anscombe, 1963). Truth is the concern of the wide 
and flourishing field of epistemology. In what follows, we will deal briefly, 
and only to the extent necessary for the development of our argument, with 
intention and epistemology (or the nature of truth).
Firstly, on intention: we can say something that is untrue in good faith. 
That occurs when we are mistaken, when we genuinely, and with some 
evidence, believe something to be true which turns out not to be. If we are 
debating in good faith, then the very truth of a statement, and the warrants 
supporting our belief that it is true, can be debated openly (Toulmin, 1964). 
On the other hand, someone who does not know whether a statement is 
true or false and, furthermore, does not care, may be uttering truths and 
falsehoods indiscriminately. Here the speaker is so thoroughly and willfully 
confusing fact and fiction that it constitutes bad faith (this will be considered 
later, using examples of false news and political falsehoods). As is the case 
in criminal law, intention counts for a lot in determining whether truth or 
falsehood are uttered in good faith.
Next – and we pause for breath! – the nature of truth. For present 
purposes we can simply say that something is true if it corresponds to an 
external state of affairs. This requires, first of all, a measure of confidence 
in our sense perceptions and in the view that they can be common to, 
or shared with, others through processes of discourse and language. This 
is not to assert that there are independent external states of affairs that are 
more or less accurately represented internally within our mind or in dis-
course. The point is, rather, that we collectively collaborate in agreeing upon 
satisfactory versions of the states of affairs in the world. To be workable 
these versions must correspond to that world – i.e., not be out of step with 
the way the world is – and be capable of forming the basis for meaningful 
discourse about the world, including our shared projects, policies and laws. 
As McDowell (1996: 11) puts it, the world as it is provides some “friction” 
for our otherwise unbounded thoughts, without which our wheels would 
spin. So the world that is relevant to us as a topic for debate is not character- 
ized by external, incontrovertible “facts”, or “givens”, in a positivist sense. 
It is a world that we continue to act in and on, through human aspirations 
and endeavours. Discourse is the means for that joint action.
By introducing discourse as a determining element of “what can be agreed 
to be” truth, we enable a social epistemology. That entails always being 
aware of the community within which discourse makes sense and statements 
can be accepted as meaningful, plausible or truthful. This is different from a 
radically relativist epistemology, because truth can and should be judged and 
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agreed upon within a community. The wider that community is, the closer 
the truth approaches to claims of universality. Yet we are always reminded 
that truth lives in a social milieu. Where there are conflicting claims to truth, 
the social origin of facts and beliefs in ways of living and shared projects 
provides a further guide to judging their truth value. Subaltern perspectives 
can be recognized for their origins in alterity or oppression, and judged in 
the context of their projects for liberation or critique. This is not to say that 
the subaltern or “southern” inevitably inevitably trumps the metropolitan 
or “northern” view. Instead it offers an alternative which is to be valued as 
such, which can be judged for its goals as well as its origins, and which is 
dignified as making truth claims no less valid than those of the dominant 
and too often taken-for-granted canon of the north. Universality can only 
be earned through dialogue, not imposed by force or authority.
coherence
This approach incorporates criteria of coherence even into discourse about 
the state of the world. This is not to insist on the reliability of representation 
per se, which is an insistence that pits correspondence against coherence as 
mutually exclusive theories of truth. The reliability of our perceptions of the 
world is not guaranteed by sense data, but by understandings of our “shared 
attention to the world” (McDowell, 1996: 36), which Gadamer (1989: 306) 
has called the “fusion of our horizons”. Far from seeing any inconsis- 
tency between correspondence and coherence theories of knowledge, the 
approach taken here follows Davidson: “Coherence concerns the relativity 
of sentences to language, that is, holism; and correspondence concerns the 
relation of speech to the world, that is, realism” (apud Dostal, 2011: 174). 
By triangulating coherence and correspondence we may arrive at a best fit, 
with the world and with each other’s understandings.
non-contradiction
The third principle for discourse in good faith is that of non-contradiction. 
We should maintain consistency with our own utterances, as well as with the 
known state of the world and the accepted meanings of the terms we use. 
Already it can be seen, in the need to have “accepted meanings”, that this 
apparently simple principle admits all sorts of interpretations. My consistency 
might be your contradiction, depending upon those meanings. So even the 
axiom of non-contradiction, which Arendt (1982: 37) saw as the apex not 
just of Kant’s logic, but of his ethics, is open to hermeneutic doubt. 
Some of the most fundamental disagreements can hinge on questions of 
contradiction among categories. I will give two examples, one from a dispute 
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in political philosophy, and the other from an imagined colonial theolog- 
ical encounter. In an article titled, appropriately for our argument, “Unruly 
Categories”, Young (1997) took issue with the exclusiveness of Fraser’s “binary 
categories” of “recognition” and “redistribution”. According to Young, 
these were not contradictory, but could be seen as complementary. Hence, 
a demand for recognition of cultural rights, or of rights to education, could 
lead to economic advancement, and hence redistribution of resources for 
indigenous people. Fraser (1997) stood her ground, insisting that the contra-
diction between recognition and redistribution was not merely conceptual, 
but reflected actual social movements.
The second example comes from Bruno Latour’s discussion of the ori-
gins of the idea of the fetish, in encounters between Portuguese traders and 
the Africans of the Guinean coast. That which is feitiço, made by humans, 
cannot be a deity, say the Portuguese: so, which is it, divine or man-made? 
But Latour’s imaginary Guineans refuse to choose, since they know neither 
the principle of non-contradiction nor the prohibition on the worship of 
idols (Latour, 1996: 16).
These two examples highlight the most salient difficulties in the 
principle of non-contradiction, embedded in the very foundations of 
neo-Kantian discourse theory (à la Habermas). As soon as we leave the 
certainties of logical formulae for the real worlds of political activism and 
intercultural relations, the certainty of non-contradiction looks much more 
shaky. What is contradictory to an eighteenth century Portuguese sailor 
might be reconciled in an alternative understanding of the world. And 
even among socialist feminists, the contradictory nature of recognition 
and redistribution can be debated from several angles: empirical, rational 
and pragmatic. In any case, debate between different positions – cultural, 
political, methodological – must be accommodated if public discourse 
is to be possible. 
These concerns have been the basis of much criticism of Habermas’s 
discourse theory. Young (1990: 106) has taken issue with Habermas’s 
attempt to claim universal moral outcomes from rational argument. Others 
have drawn attention to the broader context of deliberation, which goes 
beyond “the rational moral self as an isolated moral geometer” (Benhabib, 
1990: 358). This broader context may include the social, affective (Young, 
1987: 59 ff.) and other “argumentation-external” (Cooke, 2013) contexts, 
including habitus, ways of life and cultural backgrounds. While these 
critiques may not be fatal to discourse theory as a guide to public com-
munication, they certainly highlight the extent to which accommodation 
is required in complex societies and across cultures. In addition to good 
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faith, by which we maintain certain minimum standards of argument and 
communicative competence, we need also consider an extra virtue directed 
to communication with others: goodwill.
2.2. Recognition
Recognition is a fundamental precondition to the goodwill necessary for 
communication across different cultures, paradigms, political positions and 
methodologies. To recognize the other with whom we are in conversation or 
debate goes beyond empathy or Verstehen to an appreciation of diversity. 
To know the other in a way relevant to facilitating discourse is to understand 
that our interlocutor’s epistemological assumptions and discursive practices 
may be very different from our own. 
A minimum requirement of recognition is as old as Aristotle’s (1960) 
presumption that in public discourse we should aim to persuade our audi-
ence. This involves an understanding of the audience: a recognition of 
who they are. Such a demand takes on different dimensions in a culturally 
diverse society, whether it be as small as a town or as large as the world. 
It is easier to address our peers in a society, or a discursive reference group 
that shares a wide range of assumptions, values, background knowledge 
and communication protocols. We only need to imagine the relevant 
concerns of our audience and our discourse can be tailored accordingly. 
Recognition in that case is a simpler communicative task than is the case in 
cross-cultural discourse, where we need to understand that our audience 
might have different assumptions, even if we do not know exactly what 
they are. The very recognition of difference is a necessary precondition to 
effective communication and respectful public discourse. 
Beyond persuasion, there are, however, other reasons for expecting 
that participants in a discussion should be recognized, and there are a 
variety of means by which this can be achieved. These include the follow-
ing dimensions:
· cognitive: knowing who their partners in debate are;
· constative: being capable of accurately describing them;
· constructive: in this dimension partners are mutually constituted 
through discourse (each address contributes to making us who we 
are);
· performative: the recognition that some forms of enunciation change 
the configuration of the social world simply by being uttered.
These forms of practice are relevant to either speaker or audience or both. 
In truly dialogical interactions, of course, we are always both speaker and 
audience, but for analytical purposes it is useful to differentiate in some cases. 
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The rest of this section deals briefly with each of these forms of recognition, 
pairing the closely related cognitive with constative, and constructive with 
performative.
cognitive and constative
“Knowing” an audience can involve a range of cognitive facts: for instance, 
knowing about its histories, cultures and values. While this can be a first 
step towards more effective communication, grasping these facts may also 
be seen as a form of appropriation. Levinas (1989: 76) draws attention to 
the cross-over between the epistemological and the technical-ethical impli-
cations of “grasping”. Gadamer (1989: 299) also warns of “the danger of 
‘appropriating’ the other person in one’s own understanding and thereby 
failing to recognize his or her otherness.” Thus, while cognitive knowledge 
of the other is necessary to communication, it has its limits beyond which 
it becomes hubris and appropriation. The humility of recognizing one’s 
ignorance of the true nature of the other is one essential response to this 
limit. Beyond that, however, is the fundamental ethical stance of recogniz-
ing the difference of the other, and respecting the very unknowability of 
that difference. 
It is important but difficult for the speaker to find this humility and a 
recognition of his or her ignorance of an unfamiliar audience. It is harder 
still to step back and recognize that one’s own benchmarks and taken- 
-for-granted criteria are foreign to others, that they cannot automatically 
command universal acceptance. This was seen in relation to the criteria 
that discourse theory would apply to judgments of contradiction and 
Kantian logic.
This is not to say that there can never be criteria for aesthetic or ethical 
judgment that can be applied beyond the speaker and her or his own circle. 
It is, rather, to propose that the criteria themselves be developed through 
a dialogical process. Cross-cultural conversations are rich in moments when 
we glimpse another take on the world, gain insight into other people’s his-
tories that we did not share, and are reminded of how specific our speech 
and knowledge are to our own experience. Each of these glimpses opens 
out the possibility of further exploration, not in a rush to relativism, or to 
close off debate by quickly establishing a new benchmark, but as another 
opening for dialogue. 
Communication adds to the cognitive understanding of self. To recognize 
the other in their diversity, and to be willing to enter into dialogue, does not 
diminish the identity and self-recognition of the speaker. The more we know 
ourselves, the better we can accept difference and communicate with others. 
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Conversely, dialogue with others may be essential to an understanding of 
the self. In the Australian context, it is hard to know one’s own place as a 
descendent of European settlers in a post-colonial nation based on dispos-
session and genocide. The moments of interracial dialogue, when one hears 
the alternative perspectives of indigenous Australians, can be surprising as 
well as illuminating of our own world. These are often not the well-known 
facts of injustice and disadvantage that have been addressed so thoroughly 
in inquiries into Aboriginal deaths in custody and stolen generations of 
children (though not in government responses). They are instead the life 
experiences and the epistemological habitus of people living in Aboriginal 
cultures (who also live in white culture). Dialogue as a path to recognition 
by which the interlocutors constitute each other is our next topic. 
constructive and performative
In relation to discourse, “recognition” is used in two senses. The first is the 
cognitive sense discussed above, by which we have a “true knowledge of […] 
a person or group’s identity or situation”. The second is the “constructive” 
sense, as when a speaker is authorized by being “recognized” by the chair 
of a meeting (Markell apud Feldman, 2008: 230). So now we turn to the 
various ways in which speakers are “recognized” in the sense that they are 
communicatively constituted by being constructed by an authoritative other, 
or in confirming their own identity by performing a speech act.
Common law courts use particularly revealing language to indicate 
whether an interlocutor is recognized by the court. A party must have 
“standing” if they are to participate in a legal action. Legal counsel who is 
not authorized to appear in a matter cannot be “seen”, as when the judge 
disqualifies a barrister who is not dressed or robed appropriately. One must 
stand before a court, and be seen by the judge in order to be recognized as 
a participant in the proceedings.
Recognition as a speaker is basic to all public life. We saw above, in sec- 
tion 1.3., that Arendt (1959: 158) regarded action and speech as the inter-
linked foundations of our humanity, through the “primordial and specifically 
human act” of identifying ourselves in public discourse. Revelation of the 
speaker’s identity is essential to the political action by which we express our 
humanity, by which we are human. This active participation in human affairs 
is only possible through the full public presence of the speaker, without 
which “action loses its specific character”. Arendt identifies the exceptions 
to this rule of publicity as the criminal (who hides) and the “doer of good 
deeds” (who must remain anonymous): these are by definition roles and 
agents excluded from the public sphere of political life (ibidem: 160).
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The political agent or “public man” of Arendt’s Aristotelian model seems 
most at home in the ancient Greek agora (as in the gender Arendt gives him). 
Yet contemporary public institutions have their own protocols for revealing 
and constituting a wider range of performative public agents: speakers are 
“recognized”, parties “have standing”, advocates are “seen” and witnesses 
are sworn. By swearing an oath, a person’s subsequent speech acquires 
public status of a specifically legal nature: their identity is guaranteed and 
lies are punishable as perjury. 
Part 3 – Communicative Vices
In this section, we analyze the problems and pitfalls of public discourse by 
identifying how communication can be abused. In order to identify bad com-
municative practices, which may be designed to deceive, confuse, insult or 
injure, we will proceed by inverting the communicative virtues discussed in 
the previous section. Having identified the virtues that lead to good com-
munication, we use this method to identify communicative vices: good faith 
becomes bad faith; recognition becomes misrecognition, and so on for each 
of their components. The implications of each of these categories are consid-
ered in relation to contemporary public life. Discussion of communicative 
virtues, which is well known from the literature on communicative ethics and 
discourse theory, serves as counsel to all participants in how best to behave. 
By identifying communicative vices, on the other hand, we can venture 
a diagnosis and prognosis for the present poor state of public discourse. 
As prognosis it may serve as a warning, a caution against further deterio-
ration. As diagnosis it is hoped that, by unveiling some of the conditions 
of bad communication, a number of interventions may suggest themselves. 
3.1. bad Faith
lying
To lie means to make a statement that is not true, in that it does not cor-
respond to any particular facts in the world. How important is intention to 
this definition? There can be degrees of lying. We may exaggerate, speculate 
(without full disclosure that this is what we are doing) or report on rumours 
or unreliable material, without taking care to ensure they are true. The dif-
ficulty of reliance on source material increases with the number of sources: 
this is a well-known problem with Internet and social media communication.
The problem has been illustrated in Facebook’s trending news feed. 
In May 2016 it was revealed that this source was not entirely generated 
automatically from algorithms, but was mediated or curated by humans 
(Thielman, 2016a). This led to accusations of bias: while an algorithm could 
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be relied upon to simply report the most popular news stories, humans 
might have ulterior motives, that is to say, intentions. Three months later 
Facebook fired the staff who edited the trending news. Bizarre, offensive 
and inaccurate reports immediately headed the trending news (Thielman, 
2016b). Having done away with any checks on reliable news sources, 
Facebook, “now the biggest news distributor on the planet” (Thielman, 
2016a), had no means of checking whether an item “represents a real-
world event”.
Can an algorithm lie? In the absence of intention, all that can be claimed 
is that it is totally indifferent to truth; this is the fundamental and pervasive 
problem of Internet communication. Where humans show a similar indiffer-
ence to the sources and reliability of the news or “facts” they communicate, 
clearly there is a recklessness that destroys the truth value of anything they 
communicate. This may be seen in the case of climate change denial or 
conspiracy theories, which report rumour and fantasy to refute science and 
well known facts. Such recklessness, familiar also from the tweets of Donald 
Trump, cannot be distinguished from lying. Without trust in the source of 
the information, be it from Facebook or Trump, the content of the commu-
nication is so devalued as to be worthless or, worse, dangerous.
incoherence
Coherence fits facts about the world into a framework of understanding. 
Where the source is incoherent or inconsistent, comprehension is dimin-
ished. As we’ve seen, truth requires both correspondence and coherence. 
Considerations of narrative coherence may shape how the facts are told, 
but must not distort or conceal them. Ryan (1996: 638) mischievously calls 
lawyers “professional liars”, when all a good lawyer is doing is ensuring 
coherence along with correspondence. “[T]he cogency of a trial is some-
thing like the cogency of a novel or other literary work; its rhetoric and 
structure ought to be adapted to reinforcing the story of our commitment 
to conducting our affairs according to the law”. This fitting of facts into a 
narrative structure must be distinguished from lying.
The vice of incoherence derives from failure to link relevant facts, from 
linking unrelated facts to paint a false or misleading picture, or from conceal-
ing known and relevant information. Incoherence is fatal to understanding 
and communication, since it sabotages sense-making or leaves interpretation 
of one’s communication open to nonsense. Not only does it fail to make 
sense of the world and events, but it renders the rest of one’s utterances 
incomprehensible. In this it is related to self-contradiction.
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Self-contradiction
It has been noted that non-contradiction can depend on interpretation of 
various terms, and that criteria for this standard may ultimately depend on a 
certain level of goodwill. Self-contradiction offers a stricter standard, but only 
if we willingly enter into the epistemological framework of our interlocutor. 
A statement is not self-contradictory simply because it contradicts our 
assumptions as listeners. So within their own framework, the Guinean carv-
ings can be made by humans and also be deities. It is only the assumptions of 
Latour’s apocryphal Portuguese traders that are contradicted. But to contra-
dict oneself is blatantly to use words inconsistently (to “twist their meanings”) 
or to make assertions which are also denied, or which are countered by an 
opposite and incompatible assertion, without acknowledging or accounting 
for any discrepancy.
3.2. Misrecognition
The concept of misrecognition inverts the notion of recognition, by which 
we recognize the identity and qualities of our fellows in society (Honneth, 
1995; Taylor, 1995). We fail to recognize or respect them. Ricœur (2004: 
400) saw the opposites, reconnu – méconnu, as a perpetual threat to com-
munication, through the fundamental asymmetry of the self and the other. 
However, this also holds out the promise of a Levinasian distinction that 
could preserve “a suitable [juste] distance”, the recognition of the otherness 
of the other, that is necessary for ethical communication. We keep these 
tensions in mind as we consider the threat posed by the communicative 
vices of misrecognition. 
In discussing recognition as a communicative virtue, four distinct forms 
were listed: cognitive, constative, constructive and performative. Here 
we first consider cognitive, constative and constitutive misrecognition, 
before moving on to consider dialogic communication and the inversion 
of performative oaths in curses and blasphemy. While an oath is founded 
on self-identification, the anonymous performative will be considered as a 
particular paradox.
ignorance, insult and injury
Cognitive misrecognition involves ignorance of one’s partner in communica-
tion. This may occur in the second person, when an audience is misrecog-
nized. A speaker may assume an audience has certain characteristics or 
attitudes which they may not all share. This is a particular risk in addressing 
people from other cultures, when stereotypes and incorrect generaliza-
tions can poison communication. Even more commonly it occurs when an 
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audience is not recognized as an audience. I may be speaking to one friend but 
I am overheard by another. In public life, a politician may address a friendly 
audience, winning their approval by comments about other groups. 
This occurs when populist and xenophobic politicians insult Muslims, 
immigrants or refugees. That they do not care that some remarks are per-
ceived to be insulting by the third party suggests their failure to perceive 
any common humanity with those groups. It can also genuinely occur in 
error, as when live microphones broadcast politicians’ private comments, 
private emails are leaked, or recordings from closed meetings come to light. 
Intention is also relevant here. Was a speaker intending remarks about 
a third party to be heard by them? Was offensive stereotyping intended? 
Or was it merely ignorance? Often the unintended may be just as offensive 
as the intentional. When a police spokesperson or any other government 
representative makes unwarranted or offensive assumptions about an audi-
ence, ignorance hardly mitigates the damaging impact. When Australian 
politicians made private jokes about Pacific Islands being inundated (Keany, 
2015), even as they resisted entreaties from the leaders of those nations 
to act on climate change, the fact that they did not know they were being 
broadcast was no excuse at all. 
A particularly pernicious form of misrecognition of third parties is “dog 
whistling”, which occurs when a politician, for instance, makes coded refer-
ences in the expectation that they will only be understood by supporters 
or a specific audience. During the 2016 US presidential campaign Donald 
Trump, addressing an audience including gun owning supporters of the 
Second Amendment (that guarantees the right “to bear arms”) said, of Hillary 
Clinton, “If she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks. Although 
the Second Amendment people, maybe there is, I don’t know.” The audience 
was described by a Trump critic as “people who hate the government and 
believe they’re going to have to take up arms against it. My guess is this is a 
deliberate dog whistle to that significant number of people”  (Smith, 2016). 
In 2002, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard, who presided over a 
conservative withdrawal into a mono-ethnic fantasy of the nation, was quoted 
in an anti-terrorism security booklet distributed to households nationwide: 
“we must work together to make sure no religion or section of our com-
munity is made to feel a scapegoat because of the actions of a small number 
of fanatics”.3 Noting the difference between being “made a scapegoat” and 
Howard’s “feel a scapegoat”, Watson (2003: 103) decodes this dog whistle: 
3 Accessed on 21.01.2017, at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/liac/hot_topic/hottopic/2003/2/4.
html.
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“It might be an unintended slip, of course, but it sends the message – it’s all 
right to blame them, but don’t let them hear you.” Not only does the dog 
whistle communicate dangerous or insulting messages, it further insults the 
intelligence of the target who is expected not to understand.
Misrecognition in public speech inverts the positive constitutive effects 
of recognition. It does not address the humanity of a (direct or indirect, 
intended or otherwise) audience, thereby constituting them as partners in 
discourse. Instead it excludes them, through disrespect, insult or wilful 
misrecognition. It undermines the esteem in which they are held, by them-
selves or others. In constitutive discourse each mode of address contributes 
to making the other who they are. When it diminishes them, it undermines 
the polity. If communicative action is the foundation of the polity, virtuous 
communication builds it up; vicious communication tears it down.
The Performative and the curse: offense, blasphemy and anonymity
In addition to the constative and constitutive forms of misrecognition, 
by way of which speakers misunderstand or show disrespect for an audience, 
there are performative forms which have more direct effects. Performative 
elements that cause insult and injury can be seen when certain forms of 
speech are taken for acts. More direct forms of incitement to violence than 
dog-whistling constitute more direct threats to safety and civility. These 
distinctions and effects have been central to discussions of “hate speech”.
Austin considered authority a central condition of performativity, 
while Derrida invoked ritual and iteration as lending a similar weight to 
everybody’s actions: the signature was his prime example (Derrida, 1988: 18). 
Butler (1997) distinguishes between speech and act, noting the role of ritual, 
iteration and habitus in constituting performatives. Lazzarato draws on 
Bakhtin and Guattari in order to challenge this distinction between speech 
and act, asserting that language has no expressiveness independent of enun-
ciation: “[T]he nature of the enunciation is not performative, but dialogic, 
‘strategic’, and event-generating” (Lazzarato, 2014: 181). Insult and injury 
are not always mediated through language, signification and interpretation. 
A thoughtless remark or a gratuitous insult can also operate at a visceral and 
direct level, as action generating action. 
Seen in this way, Sarkozy’s 2005 reference, in the lead-up to his presi-
dential campaign, to the immigrant youth of the banlieues as “scum”,4 was 
4 “Vous en avez assez de cette bande de racailles? On va vous en débarrasser”. “Dix ans après. Le ‘On va 
vous débarrasser de la racaille’ de Sarkozy”, France-Ouest, 16.10.2015. Accessed on 05.09.2016, at http://
www.ouest-france.fr/politique/dix-ans-apres-le-va-vous-debarrasser-de-la-racaille-de-sarkozy-3770713.
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not (pace Butler) a performative act of hate speech. Far from operating in 
the institutionalized and determined space-time of the performative,
it is the space-time of indetermination, unpredictability, the dialogic event, the ‘battle-
-discourse’, which seeks to hold sway over others, over their behavior, by restructuring 
their field of action. (Lazzarato, 2014: 185) 
Sarkozy may have hoped that his words would win him votes from the 
xenophobic Right or goad the Left, or provoke the youth: he could not 
have known. 
In any case, the ‘response-reaction’ of the ‘scum’ highlights the dialogic nature of 
every speech act. … And [in the following month’s riots] this one provoked them all 
beyond what even their author could have hoped.  (ibidem: 186) 
While the performative operates in the realm of institutional authority, 
it remains relevant to aspects of speech and public discourse. Whereas the 
signature guarantees the efficacy of a document, the oath carries the same 
weight in spoken enunciations, as was noted in the positive examples by which 
we are identified and recognized. The vicious inversion of the performative 
oath is the curse, with its corollary of perjury (Agamben, 2011: §13 ff.). 
Benveniste (1974: 255) draws a distinction between the constative “to say 
something”, and the performative “to pronounce a name”. The difference 
between expressing a fact or an opinion and pronouncing a name – the name 
of God or identifying oneself by name – is that between making a statement 
and a “pure vocal articulation”. “This utterance is a performance; ‘to swear’ 
consists exactly of the utterance I swear, by which Ego is bound. […] The 
utterance is identified with the act itself.” (Benveniste, 1971: 229) The very 
vacuity of the oath, as with any form of the performative, is the source of its 
power and its mystery. It says nothing, yet it changes the state of the world, 
by establishing relationships (e.g. marriage or contracts), naming persons 
or things and invoking consequences for transgression. 
Agamben suggests that we may “reread the theory of performatives or 
‘speech acts’, [as] a sort of enigma, as if philosophers and linguists [of the 
twentieth century] were coming up against a magical stage of language.” 
(Agamben, 2011: §23). Vicious performative utterances make curses of oaths 
(ibidem: §13), and blasphemies of “euphemies” (Benveniste, 1974: 254). The 
curse is a presumed performative distinguished by its malevolence. Other 
forms of misrecognition stem from anonymity. Where an oath expressly 
requires us to “stand by our word”, to swear anonymously is a specific form 
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of misrecognition. It involves disavowing our word, that is, misrecognizing 
our self, and imposing that misrecognition on others.
There has always been the possibility of anonymity in public life. Pasquino, 
the “source” of graffiti and political commentary in Rome, has stood for 
anonymity for about two millennia. Yet commentary is not performative 
and Pasquino never held power. When blasphemies, curses and iconoclasm 
become anonymous, the authorization of standing by one’s own word is 
betrayed, magnifying the offense. The social order is challenged at the same 
time that the target is provoked. It is only with the extreme disintegration of 
the social order “in times of corruption, disintegration and political bank-
ruptcy” that Arendt’s anonymous “politically marginal figures” break cover 
and enter public life (Arendt, 1959: 160). Conversely, we might wonder about 
the well-being of the polity when the authors of purported performatives hide 
their identity, and public discourse increasingly hides behind social media 
avatars in the domain of anonymity.5
Throughout this paper we have seen examples of spurious argument, 
misinformation, disrespect and public threats. While they indicated vari-
ous degrees of ignorance and malice, all, except unattributed news stories, 
were sourced to an identifiable public figure. Anonymity is typically found 
in social media and some other Internet sources, hence the unattributed 
news. Anonymous curses, in the strict sense of invoking fate, a deity or some 
other supernatural power to harm someone, are also found on the Internet. 
Curses are religious injunctions, such as those calling on the faithful to kill 
Salman Rushdie or, somewhat more obliquely (in the case of the “Second 
Amendment” faithful), Hilary Clinton. As in these examples, they may be 
attributable or anonymous. Likewise, blasphemy, in the sense of insulting 
other people’s deities, may be anonymous through the Internet, or attribut-
able to particular publications. We can identify a symmetry between curses 
and blasphemy, even in contemporary public life. When blasphemy is 
perceived in the work of authors or cartoonists, a curse commonly follows. 
3.3. Conclusion: implications for Law and Public Life
A common legal response to the cycle of blasphemy and curse is to invoke 
the right to free speech, as was seen in the unedifying spectacle of prominent 
opponents of liberty and equality parading through Paris with President 
Hollande, declaring “je suis Charlie” (Todd, 2015: 135). This paper suggests 
another approach, based on the communicative virtues and vices identified 
5 My thanks to Massimo Leone and his class at the University of Turin (7 June, 2016) for pointing 
out the significance of anonymity.
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here. Curses, blasphemy and anonymous performatives have no legitimate 
place in public discourse. But, doubtful that they should be subject to crimi-
nal or civil sanctions, we can explore a different approach to legal discourse. 
Adopting a dialogic view of public communication suggests that pursuit 
of communicative virtues is more important than enforcing rights. As Wolff 
(1968: 50) pointed out, “It would be madness […] to suppose that the basic 
problem for a string quartet is to determine where the rights of the first 
violinist end and the rights of the cellist begin”. Yet, in our contemporary 
situation, to ask that political and legal deliberation proceed in harmony, 
andante or largo, is somewhere between a counsel of perfection and an 
impossible dream. 
This paper has tried to build on the strengths and sophistication of 
discourse theory and communicative ethics, while avoiding their utopian 
impulse. In recent years, public discourse has sunk to frightening levels of 
xenophobia and disrespect. The few examples cited here, from Australian 
prime ministers (2002, 2015) and presidential candidates in France (2005) 
and the United States (2016), have illustrated provocation and insult in 
twenty-first century political communication. In the absence of any opti-
mistic signs that the level of public debate might be about to improve, it is 
important to understand the dynamics of vicious communication. 
My purpose in analyzing the inverted, vicious forms of the communicative 
virtues is to understand our imperfect communicative regimes. So, rather than 
advocating virtue, the key message of this paper can only be to identify vice. 
By understanding the betrayals of humanity involved in bad faith and mis-
recognition, in insult and injury, we may be alert to the betrayers. They are the 
enemies of a legal regime based in communicative competence and harmony. 
Their methods are guaranteed to destroy a civilized polity. Law must be built 
on stronger foundations.
In specifically legal settings, this is to be found in resolving disputes, 
not inflaming them; in mediating between parties, not antagonizing them; 
in coherence and epistemic responsibility, not in self-contradiction and 
disregard for truth; in standing by and for one’s words, not in anonymity; 
in understanding the other in his or her otherness, not in condemning 
their difference. Each of these injunctions can be seen to apply to one or 
more legal procedures, formal or informal: arguing, legislating, electing 
or adjudicating. 
Yet antagonism, self-contradiction, lying, anonymity and xenophobia 
are on display in many forms of legal and political discourse. How are we 
to respond? In the late stages of writing this paper, the infamous leader of 
the One Nation Party in Australia, Senator Pauline Hanson, made her first 
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speech after being re-elected to Parliament. Decrying the “disruption caused 
by diversity”, she then devoted nearly a quarter of her speech to misleading, 
inaccurate and vicious attacks on Muslims and Islam. She called for a halt to 
further Muslim immigration and to the building of “mosques or schools”, 
and a ban on the burqa and on Halal certification fees.6 The Australian 
Greens senators stood up and walked out of the chamber. Widely criticized 
for this move, the party leader, Senator Richard Di Natale, responded:
We chose to walk out of the Senate while Ms Hanson was speaking because we did not 
want to give any kind of legitimacy to her racist views and to the racist views of others 
by sitting and listening with the respect usually afforded to parliamentarians during 
their first speech.[…] And we felt an obligation to stand up for not only Muslims 
but for the millions of Australians who welcome multiculturalism and an Australia 
that does not judge you on the colour of your skin or your religious beliefs. (2016)
This is the dilemma confronting those who are committed to communica-
tive ethics. Do we “engage with” those who lie and insult, by listening and 
responding respectfully? Or do we identify such miscommunication as being 
beyond the parameters of decent, responsible debate, and therefore refuse 
engagement? While this analysis has not addressed such choices explicitly, 
it does offer some guidance. For those concerned with communicative 
competence and a healthy public sphere, there are ways to debate that allow 
the parties to engage each other directly. Truth or falsity can be compared, 
coherence can be expected, contradiction can be questioned, audiences can 
be addressed and respected. In the absence of these conditions, debate is 
not possible. Lying, incoherence, self-contradiction, insult and injury fall 
outside the bounds of public discourse, and cannot be admitted.
To recognize these vices requires an inclusive understanding of the com-
municative community, which might be a polity, the parties to a dispute, 
or an international assembly, whether connected by proximity or by telecom-
munications. An utterance can be judged by the breadth of the speaker’s 
imagined audience. Proper assessment cannot be made by assuming public 
discourse is addressed to a self-selected private audience. For truly public 
discourse, the diversity of peoples in the world or within a polity are all part 
of an inclusive audience. 
In any field of legal or political discourse – legislating, electing, adju-
dicating or arguing – each betrayal is to be named for what it is, before it 
provokes the next vicious response. Quick communicative intervention 
6 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 September 2016 (Pauline Hanson).
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is needed to identify unconscionable communication if we are to avoid 
the vicious circle of curse to blasphemy, and blasphemy to curse, until the 
poison kills the body politic. 
Edited by João Paulo Moreira
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Direito e argumento por um  
mundo culturalmente diversificado:  
como não comunicar
O presente artigo faz uma revisão do papel 
do discurso no direito e na vida pública e 
identifica ameaças que surgem na política, 
resultantes de formas de comunicação 
maliciosas. Para além do papel que assume 
na argumentação legal, a comunicação é 
fundamental para o debate público na cria-
ção de leis e políticas, constituindo ainda o 
tecido social e político através da utilização 
de formas de tratamento e de reconheci-
mento dos outros. Este argumento baseia- 
-se em aspetos da teoria do discurso, da 
teoria feminista e de outras críticas que 
sugerem que se aplica a uma comunidade 
restrita de discurso, excluindo outras 
culturas. Assume uma perspetiva alargada 
de participantes no debate público, que 
necessariamente ultrapassa fronteiras 
nacionais e culturais. Uma comunicação 
responsável exige que se argumente de 
boa-fé, com verdade e coerência, e que se 
reconheçam os intervenientes na discus-
são, tanto por aquilo que são, como pelo 
Droit et argument pour un  
monde culturellement diversifié:  
comment ne pas communiquer
Cet article passe en revue le rôle du dis-
cours dans le droit et dans la vie publique 
et identifie des menaces qui apparaissent 
en politique à partir de formes de commu-
nication malveillantes. En plus de son rôle 
dans l’argument juridique, la communica-
tion est fondamentale pour le débat public 
dans la formation des lois et des politiques, 
et elle constitue le tissu social et politique à 
travers l’utilisation de formes d’adresse et 
de reconnaissance d’autrui. Cet argument 
s’appuie sur des aspects de la théorie du 
discours, de la théorie féministe et d’autres 
critiques suggérant qu’il s’applique à une 
étroite communauté de discours, ce qui 
exclut d’autres cultures. Il assume une 
vision élargie des participants au débat 
public, qui traverse nécessairement les 
frontières nationales et culturelles. La 
communication responsable exige de nous 
une discussion de bonne foi, véridique 
et cohérente, et que nous reconnaissions 
nos partenaires en discussion, tant pour 
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papel que detêm numa comunidade parti- 
lhada. O artigo argumenta que o discurso 
público desceu a níveis perigosos neste 
século, citando exemplos de má-fé, pro-
vocação e insulto por parte de primeiros- 
-ministros australianos (2002, 2015) e 
candidatos presidenciais na França 
(2005) e nos Estados Unidos (2016). Con- 
clui defendendo que a mentira, a incoerên-
cia, a contradição, o insulto e a injúria se 
situam fora dos limites do discurso público. 
É necessária uma intervenção rápida ao 
nível da comunicação, que identifique 
cada uma destas formas de comunicação 
maliciosa como uma traição do público 
cívico, antes que se desencadeie a próxima 
reação maliciosa.
Palavras-chave: comunicação maliciosa; 
direito; diversidade cultural; epistemolo-
gia; retórica; teoria do discurso.
ce qu’ils sont, que pour leur place dans une 
communauté partagée. L’article fait valoir 
que le discours public a atteint des niveaux 
dangereux au cours du siècle présent, en 
citant des exemples de mauvaise foi, de 
provocation et d’insulte de la part de pre-
miers ministres australiens (2002, 2015) et 
de candidats présidentiels en France (2005) 
et aux États-Unis (2016). Il conclut que le 
mensonge, l’incohérence, l’auto-contra-
diction, l’insulte et la blessure sont hors 
limites du discours public. Une interven-
tion communicative rapide est nécessaire 
pour identifier chacune de ces formes de 
communication malveillante comme une 
trahison du public civique, avant qu’elle 
ne provoque la prochaine réponse vicieuse.
Mots-clés: communication malveillante; 
diversité culturelle; droit; épistémologie; 
rhétorique; théorie du discours.
